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Recently in the literature, there have been many attempts to expand classic models of 
market competition analysis. Considering firms are competing globally against many 
different sellers over different markets, recent works proposed a model where it is 
possible to represent competition among companies where they compete against each 
other directly and indirectly, using a hypergraph to represent the competition structure. 
This document presents an attempt to demonstrate how the young and maturing 
networked price competition model, which allows finding the best price for the 
companies from the competition structure and market sizes, can be used in any case of 
study. 
This work continues the recent demand to adapt the famous Bertrand competition model, 
where sellers ask for prices. Since there are no recent works which use the recent model, 
it has been presented how to use it in such a way that is possible to guess the competition 
structure and the distribution of the buyers by only by observing how companies are 
pricing. 
To better understand the applications of the existing method, the first real case of study 
which has used the Bertrand Network model is presented: a competition among 6 flight 
companies, where prices were collected by using the Google Flight tracking service, 
concluding that the proofs and claims developed in this work are useful to enhance market 
analysis. 
Keywords: Bertrand network, game theory, Nash equilibrium, market, analysis  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This dissertation emerged after the review of some existing models that apply the 
Game Theory in the economic field. One new mathematical model that represents 
price competition with many sellers over many different markets has been chosen to 
be used for the first time. 
This initial chapter aims to present the work developed in its general lines: the 
validation of a new mathematical model to analyze markets. It presents the project 
context, motivation, and proposed objectives, as well as a summary of the conclusion 
and open problems, ending by describing the structure of the rest of the document. 
1.1 Project context 
Game theory has been applied in the economic scenario since its beginning, becoming 
one of the main mathematic tools used to analyze the market [1]. Game Theory has the 
special property of showing the best set of options or probabilities of each player, used 
mainly to predict social and economic behaviors [2]. 
Many authors have been trying to build a mathematical model that allows representing 
competitions where one seller compete against multiple sellers at the same time (directly 
and indirectly). While made sense to represent only direct competitions in the past, 
nowadays firms are reacting in real time to price changes with online tools [3], such 
strategy has been named as Fast-Changing Web Prices [4]. A more robust model is needed 
to represent a competition where firms are directly and indirectly competing against each 
other, being recently developed and improved both for games where sellers choose prices 
[5, 3, 6, 7, 8] and for games where sellers supply an amount of a good [9, 10], leaving the 
price to be decided by an auctioneer [11]. 
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Although there are many works for the Networked version of the Cournot competition 
(where sellers supply quantities of a certain good rather than specifically ask for prices, 
like in the Bertrand competition), the Networked version of the Bertrand model is still 
young and under development. A thorough search of the relevant literature has not shown 
any article that has used the Bertrand Network model in a real scenario. 
1.2 Motivation 
Since many companies are competing globally by having many physical stores around 
the world or by offering international shipping via online tools, it makes sense to say that 
companies are competing against many others at the same time. As stated by [6], in the 
Cournot’s famous paper of 1838, zinc producers are not only competing against each 
other but also indirectly against manufacturers of copper since both have a common major 
customer: the brass producers. Either zinc and copper producers are targeting the money 
of the brass manufactures since their materials are needed to produce brass. 
Nowadays this happens on a larger scale. As noticed by [4] and quoted by [3], the price 
of a microwave changed 9 times during the day, a response from Best Buy and Sears to 
Amazon prices. Motivated by the fact that there is a new mathematical model to represent 
networked pricing competitions and it lacks practical usages, this work aims to offer an 
innovative way to approach a new market, study its potential and presents all the steps 
done for a real case of study.  
1.3 Goals 
In the existing Bertrand Network model, Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) is found from market 
sizes, where the Nash Equilibrium represents the best set of pricing range for each seller, 
as well as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for each seller, representing its 
change of asking the price lower than 𝑥.  
In previous work from the author [8] an unreal competition is used in a reversed manner: 
prices were said to be collected and it was considered that sellers are being rational in 
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their pricing choices (following their N.E.). Therefore, by having assumed the rationality 
of the players and by knowing how the equilibrium looks like for some competition 
structures (from the results in [7]), it was possible to demonstrate how to find the size of 
the markets from the hypothetic prices and CDFs. 
The pricing competition that has been chosen for this work is a competition among 6 air 
companies and the goal is to apply the steps shown in [8] and figure out the potential of 
the market, introducing an innovative way to analyze an existing market. 
1.4 Contributions of this work 
In the present document, the assumptions made in the previous work [8] were extended: 
since the case of study for air companies has presented a competition network that 
contains few constraints (companies that asks higher prices must have a bigger captive 
market than the competitors that are asking lower prices). Also, motivated by some 
strange results found during the development of this work (like the size of one captive 
market being negative, which is not possible), assumptions were made and instead of 
saying that one company is being irrational, it was concluded that hidden competitors (not 
shown in the research made by the author) must be present, justifying the strange values 
found. 
Moreover, claims have been proved and are presented in the third section of this work, 
which may enhance the results of the application of the proposed reversed approach. 
Theorem 3.1. Every inverse CDF is upper bounded. 
This theorem is important to show that every inverse CDF is bounded so conditions like 
α𝑖 ≥ α𝑖+1 and α𝑖 > 0 is true for every seller. From this result, the following corollaries 
was also proved to be correct. 
Corollary 3.1. Any dataset is called reliable if, for every inverse CDF function calculated 
from the dataset using (2), its upper bound condition from Theorem 1 is true and every 
upper bound is lesser or equal than 1. Furthermore, a non-reliable dataset suggests 
hidden sellers exist in the network or the price data set is too small to be trusted. 
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If some conditions from the theorem don’t hold, then the dataset cannot be used to 
calculate the probability of a seller to choose a price of 𝑥 or higher. 
Corollary 3.2. If an upper bound condition from Theorem 3.1 is greater than 1, there 
may exist hidden sellers in the network that justify the prices companies are using. 
Corollary 3.3. If an upper bound condition (9) from Theorem 4.1 is false, there may exist 
hidden sellers in the network that justify the prices companies are using 
This means that sellers may be hidden in the network. If a condition from the Theorem 
3.1 is not satisfied, it is possible that a seller is hidden, which could have made the 
unsatisfied condition to be true. 
Observation 3.1. Fix any network and any collected prices. It is possible to verify if there 
exists any size of markets that satisfy the observed prices by testing a non-linear system. 
Moreover, if the equation system does not have a solution, the network must be changed. 
Observation 3.2. It is possible to know how much buyers might be willing to pay based 
on the observed prices. 
Both observations propose a non-linear equation system in which can be used in a 
software able to deal with this type of equation system. 
Open problems extend to show how to calculate the size of the hidden markets, instead 
of just assuming they must exist. 
1.5 Document structure 
Section 2 presents the current state of the literature regarding the use of mathematical 
models which uses Game Theory as the main tool to analyze market competitions, also 
having a subsection to explain the model with a warm-up example to better understand 
how it works. Section 3 shows the application of the reversed model in the same 
hypothetic model to understand its potential, having one subsection with the profs of the 
claims briefly shown in the previous subsection. Section 4 presents the research 
methodology used in this work, serving as a bridge from the related work section and the 
section with the case of study. Section 5 is reserved for the case of study that considered 
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a real competition in the air transport industry, in which the profs and claims from section 
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Chapter 2 Related work 
This chapter presents related works that have contributed to this work, either by 
providing a starting point or by introducing concepts to the author that helped to 
understand what the scientific community has been recently working on. It is also 
shown a hypothetic application of the model to better understand its structure. 
2.1 Game theory 
Game theory presents a mathematical model for decision-making that can be applied in 
the real world, firstly introduced in 1994 [1]. A game is defined as something composed 
by a set of players, they can be persons, objects, companies, everything capable to make 
decisions, simultaneously or sequential to other players. Each movement (or strategy) 
may have different outcomes, either good or bad. If each player wants to get the best out 
of the game, each of them must consider the set of options of all the other competitors. It 
is said that, if a player is always choosing the best option, it is said that the player is being 
rational [12]. 
There are many types of games, especially focused on the economic field. Reference [1] 
presents a case of study from an economic region of Taiwan. Considering local 
governments with different interests it is proposed a mathematical model for a 
cooperative game (every player tries to optimize the outcome of both at the same time) 
and a non-cooperative game, where each of them tries to selfishly optimize their own 
outcome. The authors concluded that cooperation between them is very beneficial, ending 
with a suggestion of how they could cooperate. The usage of Game Theory to show that 
cooperation is possible also appeared in other studies [13, 14]. Another study has also 
shown that merge of companies can be profitable [10]. 
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Games can be applied either for the external process (competition among firms, for 
example) or for the internal process of a company. A study has been presented by [14] 
where it has been constructed a payoff matrix, representing the gains and losses of each 
department for each third-party company that could be chosen. In the end, the Nash 
Equilibrium has been found, concluding which outsource company should be hired. In 
the study, there were three departments, each of them with a different priority: low cost, 
quality and low cost of transport. 
Game Theory can also be used to assist banks in a decision-making game: accept or 
decline loan requests [15]. The most interesting part of this study is that they point out 
the possibility to use Game Theory to enhance data-mining (analysis of a large dataset 
with the objective of extracting implicit information). 
2.1.1 Nash Equilibrium 
Consider two persons on a phone call that ends abruptly. There is no other way to 
communicate, what should each of them do? If both decide to wait, no one will receive a 
call, if both decide to call back, the line will be busy and again, they won’t be able to 
communicate. The game is represented in the following payoff matrix: 
 
Table 1: Payoff matrix. Rows and columns represent the set of options available for player A and B, 
respectively. 
  Player B 
Player A Wait Call back 
Wait 0 1 
Call back 1 0 
 
As it is possible to see in Table 1, both players have the outcome of zero when they take 
the same decision. Considering that they are playing at the same time, player A’s 
reasoning will look something like: “I should wait if he decides to call me back, but what 
if he is thinking that I’ll call him back? Then I should call him back, but what if he is 
thinking the same? If that is the case, he will call me back, therefore I must wait, but what 
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if he is thinking the same? Then…”. How to solve this endless thinking?12 Nash 
Equilibrium3 has the goal to square endless thoughts, being the starting point of almost 
every game [2]. 
Reference [2] states the Nash Equilibrium as being a strategy setting where each player 
is choosing the best response to what he believes the other player will do in the game. 
There may be many N.E., in those cases more information is needed to determine which 
of them is more likely to arise. 
Pure Nash Equilibrium. This type of N.E. has the property of, given the set of options 
of each player, there exists at least one option that yields the best outcome to the player, 
no matter what the others will do4.  
Consider the competition network in Figure 1. Firms 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 are charging the buyers 
𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵 to cross their bridge to The Irish Pub. Both firms announce their price 
simultaneously and the edge from the costumer to the firm represents from which firm 
they can buy. 𝐶𝐵 costumers always buy from the firm that is asking the lower price.  
There are many reasons why the costumers 𝐶𝐴 won’t use the bridge from the firm 𝐹2 (they 
are loyal to the firm 𝐹1), for instance, they could have had problems with the other firm 
and so they refuse to pay for their service or maybe the other bridge is just too far or too 
difficult to reach. 
 
 
Figure 1: Competition between two toll companies for two sets of consumers. (Reproduced from [5].) 
                                                 
1 It is possible to argue that there exists an implicit agreement that the person who will be calling back will be the same one who 
started the call. In fact, this is an example taken from the book: The Art of Strategy [2] and it is also addressed in similar situations, 
where even when a communication is impossible, it is obvious that the decision of the other player will be X or Y. (It is worth 
reading one of the examples, p. 110.) 
2 A similar example (with endless thinking) can be found at [2], p. 102, being solved with the Mixed Nash Equilibrium at the p. 
159. 
3 Theorem proved by John Nash, receiving later the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994, the first Nobel Prize for the Game Theory 
[2]. His work has inspired the movie A Beautiful Mind. 
4 In many games it is considered that players are rational. This means that they will not choose one available option if clearly 
another one would lead to a better outcome. See [2], p. 70 about the usage of dominant strategies and how this characterizes the 
Nash equilibrium.  
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It is proven for the given example that there is no Pure N.E. Imagine that 𝐹2 is told the 
price that 𝐹15 is going to choose, then, to raise his chance of winning all the buyers 𝐶𝐵 he 
will ask a price arbitrary lower than 𝐹1. The first firm may be able to predict this and 
therefore will try to undercut the second firm. This would happen until both reaches the 
marginal cost (in this example, the price zero), therefore both would have no profit. Since 
𝐹1 has a captive market (loyal buyers), instead of asking the price of 0 he would choose 
the maximum price that 𝐶𝐴 are willing to pay. 𝐹2, by predicting the movement of 𝐹1, 
would ask a price arbitrary lower to extract some surplus from the 𝐶𝑏 and this reasoning 
will never halt. There is no price that they would stop changing to obtain a higher profit, 
a probabilistic feature is needed so they can choose price randomly, tricking the opponent 
and forcing him to also choose his price in the same way (a Mixed N.E.). 
If 𝐶𝐴 were removed from the competition network, 𝐹1 would have no captive market. 
Therefore, they would undercut each other until both reaches a marginal cost. A Pure 
N.E. exists since 𝐹1 would not be able to charge a monopolized price from his loyal buyers 
(𝐶𝐴 = 0). If any of the firms decide to charge a higher value, they would for sure lose 𝐶𝐵 
to the competitor, therefore none of the firms are willing to raise the price by any reason, 
even if the competitor decides to do so. Charging a lower price does not worth it since 
they would have a deficit. It doesn’t matter what the other firm will do, choosing the price 
of 0 will always the best option6. 
Mixed Nash Equilibrium. As briefly shown before, Mixed N.E. solve games where Pure 
N.E. does not exist by adding probability features. As shown in [16] after analyzing 459 
penalties they concluded that it is impossible for the goalkeeper to have a strategy that 
guarantees he will always catch the ball. In that game, the ball can travel 11 meters from 
the kick mark to the goal at a maximum speed of 125 mph, reaching the goal about two-
tenths of a second after having been kicked. Therefore, it is possible to safely say that 
they must decide their actions before the kick. 
                                                 
5 The idea that one company may know what the competitor will do comes from the fact that, considering each player are rational 
and they are trying to maximize their utility level, both tries to predict what the other will do, therefore they try to be one step 
forward. The idea of being one step forward is represented in [2], chapter 5 with the game The Princess Pride, where the hero 
(Westley) and the villain (Vizzini) plays a game: the hero poison one of the two cups, takes one to himself and gives the other to 
Vizzini that now has a choice of swapping or not the cups. The problem comes with the endless thinking of both players, the hero 
might have tried to trick the opponent by taking the poisoned cup to himself, expecting to be one step forward by imaging the 
adversary will swap the cups. But what if Vizzini is 1 step ahead the hero? The hero may try to be 1 more step ahead. This can go 
infinitely and the best option for both players is to decide to give or swap the cups randomly with equal probability. Unfortunately to 
the villain, the hero had poisoned both cups because he is immune to the poison that was being used: they were playing different 
games without knowing. 
6 It is assumed that both firms cannot communicate and agree to charge the same price, forming a cartel. In many countries, this is 
forbitten [2]. 
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The study concludes that the goalkeeper must jump to the kicker’s left more frequently 
than kickers choose to kick. In fact, this is what happens: goalkeepers choose to jump to 
the kicker’s natural side 56.6 percent of kicks, compared to 44.9 percent instance for 
kickers7. 
The most important fact about NE is that, for any finite and continuous game, there exists 
at least one pure or mixed NE [17]. 
Non-Nash equilibrium. It is worth noting the difference between a Nash and a Non-nash 
equilibriums. A Non-NE is basically a strategy that can be chosen that will lead the player 
to regret his decision. When a player is behaving rationally, he cannot choose a strategy 
A that, knowing the adversary expectations, would lead to a worse outcome than choosing 
a strategy B 
Consider the game Rock, Paper and Scissors. There is no pure NE, it is not possible to 
choose one of the 3 options without regretting the decision, there is always a better option 
to be chosen. Imagine player A always choose paper, player B will be able to predict his 
next moves and start choosing scissors. In this example, player A would be forced to 
change his original strategy. This doesn’t happen in equilibrium.  
In this game, players must randomize and choose each strategy with 33.33% of 
probability [2], where each player would win roughly 33.33% of the time, having the 
same chance for drawing or losing. The mixed NE shows the best set of probability for 
each player. If player A decides to choose rock with 1% of probability instead of 33.33%, 
he will only be benefiting player B because every time B plays scissor (33.33% of the 
time), he can or have a tie, or have a win, which is great for B but not for A. In other 
words, not very mixed probability represents an equilibrium. 
2.2 Competition Models 
There is two famous competition model in the literature, both having been proposed for 
duopoly instances and being expanded in future works: the Cournot and the Bertrand 
model.  Both models were published in the nineteenth century and are still being used in 
                                                 
7 In the study the center has been ignored since it represented less than 3% of the dataset. 
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the economic field. The remainder of this section explains each of the models, followed 
by some works from other authors related to those models. 
2.2.1 Cournot model 
In the model from 1838, the competition among firms occurs by them supplying an 
amount of a homogeneous good (identical), while the price is determined by an auctioneer 
[11]. This idea may not look trivial, but it has been proposed considering two sellers that 
possessed one source of water each, supplying to the market water instead of charging a 
price per volume, being the first model that considered a duopoly competition [9]. 
There are many papers related to this model, in particular considering electricity supply 
companies [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], being one of the most common model used to represent 
competition among few firms, getting better results than other complex methodologies 
such as the Supply Function Equilibria (SFE)8.  
There are methods that try to optimize the SFE, one of them is known as the Cournot 
Adjustment Process [24]. Basically, each competitor asks his marginal cost one at a time. 
The next, by observing other’s offers, performs an optimization step, converging rapidly 
to the SFE equilibrium. 
Recently it has been proposed an algorithm that can compute the NE in a competition 
network [9]. In the classic model, firms compete à la Cournot for only one market. 
However, as briefly stated in the first section of this paper, it is common that sellers are 
competing against multiple sellers, either directly and indirectly (See Figure 2). 
Therefore, a model capable of representing this kind of competition is needed and has 
been explored in the past few years [25, 26, 27]. As shown in [28], the efficiency loss 
changes when you consider a competition network where not every company disputes for 
every market (discriminatory access), instead of considering that every company 
participates in every market. The authors state that the networked competition model is 
still maturing and there are few works available. 
 
                                                 
8 Model where it is considered that every competitor is trying to maximize their gains under a demand uncertainty [24]. However, 
this model requires an elevated computational complexity (𝑂(2𝑛) 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) and it in some cases a solution may not exist. 
Therefore, many studies considered only small competitions. 
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Figure 2: Competition between 10 multinationals competing with one another in various product 
categories. (Reproduced from [29].) 
 
2.2.2 Bertrand Model 
Bertrand, in 1883, after having criticized the Cournot model, he developed a duopoly 
model where firms compete by asking prices, instead of supplying an amount of good to 
the market. This is, in fact, a contrast to the criticized model and he concluded that both 
companies would try to undercut each other until they reach their marginal cost, the 
minimum price they can ask that pays the production expenses [9]. 
This model has been used in many competition studies based on prices [3]. In [30] it was 
suggested a mathematical model where firms compete with prices and costumers decides 
how many of the given good they want from each firm, while every firm has a limit of 
how many items they can sell. This model was used in the study of Cognitive Radio 
Networks [31], where there were many buyers willing to buy bandwidths. In the game, 
sellers must place the distribution towers to have no interference, but also considering 
how do the buyers are located.  
In the following subsection, it is presented the Bertrand Network model, a maturing 
mathematical model that can be used to represent direct and indirect competitions. In the 
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existing models, big sellers influence other sellers in their price decision even if they are 
not direct competitors. 
2.3 Bertrand Network 
This subsection presents a model for price competition in networked markets firstly 
introduced by [5] and expanded in other works [7, 3, 6, 8]. The first model contains a very 
basic structure, while the expanded model contains proofs of the existence of NE for any 
competition network. As stated earlier, John Nash has proven that every game has a Nash 
Equilibrium but there are some requirements for those games: the game, the number of 
players and the set of strategies must be finite. Also, for any sharing rule, “if the strategy 
spaces are compact metric and the payoff correspondence is bounded and upper hemi-
continuous, with nonempty, compact, convex values, then such a solution exists” [32]. 
For this work, it was considered the model in [7] since its structure is more robust, also 
containing profs and demonstration for some types of competitions. The most important 
contribution in [7] is that the authors assert the existence of the NE in any setting of their 
price competition game by proving that their game is an instance of a Discontinuous 
Game with Endogenous Sharing Rules, proven to always have an NE [32]. In their case, 
discontinuous utility9 arises when a tie occurs: two sellers are asking the same price. To 
exist an NE in any network, the authors simply consider the subspace of strategies where 
there are no ties. Therefore, it is not needed to explicitly say what happens at the tie points 
since it won’t interfere in the mixed NE.  
Extensions of the model were not used because they are just improvement of the utility 
formula from [7] and some assumptions were relaxed, they do not change the general idea 
of the model (like considering a cost formula to the utility of the sellers, which turns out 
to be only a constant that decreases the price value [3]). Since this work attempts to find 
an application for this model, it was focused in the second version of the networked 
model. 
Now, the following properties of the model: 
                                                 
9 Can also be understood in this context as “profit” 
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• Let 𝐻 = (𝐹,𝑀) be the hyper-graph (graph, for short) where 𝐹 are firms and 𝑀 
represents the markets. The market 𝑚𝑘 groups any firm 𝑓𝑖 that participates in the 
market 𝑘. 
• For this model, |𝑚𝑘| = 2 for any 𝑘. This means that only two firms can compete 
for a market share. For every 𝑚𝑘 that represents the competition between the firms 
𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑗, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, the size of the market share (number of buyers) is represented by 
β𝑖,𝑗 > 0. 
• Each firm 𝑖 may have a captive market10 of size α𝑖 > 0. 
• Firms cannot price discriminate, this means they offer the same price for every 
market he participates. 
• Let 𝑁(𝑖) be the set of neighbors of 𝑖. 
• Every buyer β𝑖,𝑗 buys from the firms that asks the lowest price. 
• Buyers are willing to pay a price that ranges from 0 to 1 (inclusive). 
• The utility function for the firm 𝑖 is: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑥(𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑥)) (1) 
•  𝐹𝑖(𝑥) is a non-decrescent function that represents the inverse Cumulative 
Distribution Function, the chance of firm 𝑖 to choose the price of at least 𝒙 (price 
greater than or equal to 𝑥). It may be understood as a portion of the market that 
will buy from them at the price 𝑥. 
• Marginal costs for every firm are set to 0. 
• In the game, firms choose an interval of prices. This means that, for an interval 
[𝑡𝑚, 𝑡𝑛], the firm does not do better than randomizing a price within his support 
(strategy). The support of each firm is in [0,1] and is refered as 𝑆𝑖. Firms may 
have multiple intervals. 
                                                 
10 Monopolized market. Can be understood as a set of buyers that will buy from the firm no matter the price, as long it is lower or 
equal than 1. There are several reasons for this to happen: bad experience with other sellers, geographic reasons, etc. 
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 
16 
• When a firm is said to have an atom11 in 1, the firm chooses the price of 1 with 
positive probability. In other words: 𝐹𝑖(1) > 0. Only firms with a positive captive 
market may have an atom at 1. 
Example of three sellers in line. To better understand the model, a warm-up example is 
introduced for a hypothetic competition. 
 
 
Figure 3: Line competition network. Empty nodes represent firms with no captive market. Firms 1 to 3 
are represented from left to right. The support of each firm is represented with the thick lines and the 
black circle represents an atom in 1. (Reproduced from [7].) 
 
In any equilibrium, each firm must be indifferent in extracting the maximum surplus from 
his captive market and conquer all the buyers from the market shares. According to the 
results in [7], firm 1 has the support of [𝑡2, 𝑡1] because at 𝑡1 he sells only to the captive 
market, and at the value 𝑡2, he sells both to the whole market share β1,2 and to his loyal 
buyers α1. To be unpredictable, firms must mix, thus the inverse CDF function that says 
to the firms how to randomize. 
On the other hand, firm 2 must be indifferent between extracting the surplus from both 
market shares. There exists an interval [𝑡2, 𝑡1] and [𝑡3, 𝑡2] that allows the second seller to 
compete for both markets β1,2 and β2,3 in a balanced way. 
                                                 
11 The word atom comes from the measure theory, which means that, for a given measure of a value, the result is positive. This is the 
case when it is measured the probability of a firm to choose the price of 1. If the measure (result) yields a positive value, then that 
value has an atom. 
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Last, but not least, firm 3 must compete in the interval [𝑡3, 𝑡2] because he will always 
benefit if firm 2 randomly choses any price in [𝑡2, 𝑡1], wining the whole market β2,3. 
Considering that firms are playing rationally; this reasoning will affect how the second 
seller will choose any price in [𝑡2, 𝑡1]. 
All the statements above can be formalized as follows: 
𝑢1(𝑡1) = 𝑢1(𝑥) for all  𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2, 𝑡1] 
𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑥) for all  𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡1] 
𝑢3(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑥) for all  𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡2] 
To find the to find the equilibrium of the system, it is needed to calculate every price 𝑡𝑘 
and find the CDF 𝐹𝑖(𝑥) for every 𝑖 and 𝑥. The steps are shown below. 
Finding 𝒕𝟏 and 𝒕𝟐. From (1): 
𝑡1 ∗ α1 = 𝑢1(𝑡1) = 𝑢1(𝑡2) = 𝑡2 (α1 + β1,2𝐹2(𝑡2)) 
The best value for 𝑡1 is 1, maximizing the utility of 𝑓1 at 𝑡1. 
From the last Equation: 




Finding 𝑭𝟑(𝒕𝒋) for every 𝒋 in the system. Since the price of 𝑡3 is the minimal price in 
the support of 𝑓3, 𝐹3(𝑥) = 1 for all 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡3. On the other hand, with 𝑡2 being the maximum 
price in his support, 𝐹3(𝑡2) = 0 by claiming the lemma 4.2 in [7, p. 9] which states that 
“no two sellers who share a market both have an atom at the same positive price”. This 
implies that 𝐹2(𝑡2) > 0.  
Considering that 𝑡1 does not belong to the support of 𝑓3, 𝐹3(𝑡1) = 0. More generally, 
𝐹3(𝑥) = 0 for all 𝑥 ≥ 𝑡2. 
Finding 𝑭𝟐(𝒕𝒋) for every 𝒋. As α2 = 0, the firm 𝑓2 cannot have an atom at 1, therefore, 
𝐹2(𝑡1) = 0. 
Applying the same reasoning from 𝐹3(𝑡3), 𝐹2(𝑥) = 1 for all 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡3. 
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Finally, for 𝐹2(𝑡1): 
𝑡2 ∗ β2,3 ∗ 𝐹2(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑡3) = 𝑡3 ∗ β2,3 ∗ 𝐹2(𝑡3) 




















Finding 𝑭𝟏(𝒕𝒋) for every 𝒋. The minimum price in the support of 𝑓1 is 𝑡2, therefore, 
𝐹1(𝑥) = 1 for all 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡2. 
For 𝐹1(𝑡1): 
𝑡1 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑡1) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑡1)) = 𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑡2) = 𝑡2 (𝛽1,2𝐹1(𝑡2) + 𝛽2,3𝐹3(𝑡2)) 
β1,2 ∗ 𝐹1(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑡2) = 𝑡2 ∗ 𝛽1,2 
𝐹1(𝑡1) = 𝑡2 
Finding 𝒕𝟑. The last price to be found: 
𝑡1 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑡1) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑡1)) = 𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑡3) = 𝑡3 (𝛽1,2𝐹1(𝑡3) + 𝛽2,3𝐹3(𝑡3)) 





Now it has been found every 𝑡𝑗 and 𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑗) for every 𝑖 and 𝑗. It is possible to find the 
generic function 𝐹𝑖(𝑥) for every 𝑥 in the support of the firms. 
CDF for 𝑭𝟐(𝒙). Considering that the support of the firm 𝑓2 is [𝑡3, 𝑡2] ∪ [𝑡2, 𝑡1], it is 
shown below the generic formula that passes through every 𝑡𝑗. 
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𝑡1 (α1 + β1,2𝐹2(𝑡1)) = 𝑢1(𝑡1) = 𝑢1(𝑥) = 𝑥 (α1 + β1,2𝐹2(𝑥))∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2, 𝑡1] 











− 1)∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2, 𝑡1] 
Note that, at the boundary points, the values of the inverse CDF for 𝑓2 are the same as 
found previously for 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. 
For the interval [𝑡3, 𝑡2]: 
𝑡2β2,3𝐹2(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑥) = 𝑥β2,3𝐹2(𝑥) ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡2] 








 ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡2] 
CDF for 𝑭𝟏(𝒙). For all 𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2, 𝑡1], the following holds: 
𝑡1 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑡1) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑡1)) = 𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑥) = 𝑥 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑥) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑥)) 
β1,2𝐹1(1) = 𝑥β1,2𝐹1(𝑥) 




 ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2, 𝑡1] 
CDF for 𝑭𝟑(𝒙). For the last inverse CDF, the following holds for all 𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡2] 
𝑡2 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑡2) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑡2)) = 𝑢2(𝑡2) = 𝑢2(𝑥) = 𝑥 (β1,2𝐹1(𝑥) + β2,3𝐹3(𝑥)) 
𝑡2β1,2 = 𝑥 (β1,2 + β2,3𝐹3(𝑥)) 
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∗ (𝑡2 − 𝑥)∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3, 𝑡2] 
The results have been summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 2: Results summary for each inverse CDF per each interval. 

















∗ (𝑡2 − 𝑥) 
[0, 𝑡3] 1 1 1 
Applying the results in a hypothetic example. Consider a competition with the same 
settings shown in Figure 3. Every firm sells laptops and there are two types of costumers: 
Whom seeking high-end laptops and others interested a good laptop for casual usage [8]. 
Seller 𝑓1 sells gaming laptops and 𝑓2 sells computers that are roughly good for games and 
very good for casual usage. Last, 𝑓3 sells devices not very good for games but does a good 
job for other type of usage. Let β1,2 be the number of buyers interested in high 
performance computers and β2,3 the portion of users interested either in computers with 
good performance for games or casual laptops.  
Every buyer is willing to pay up to 1000€. 𝑓1 is known to provide computers with high-
quality. Let α1 be the number of buyers interested only on computers from 𝑓1. Other 
companies are new in the market, having no loyal buyers. 
For the values α1 = 20, β1,2 = 150 and β2,3 = 185: 
𝑡1 = 1 → 1000€ 
𝑡2 = 0.2294520548 → 229.94€ 
𝑡3 = 0.102739726 → 102.74€ 
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The next figures show the inverse CDF the utility of every firm. Formally, 𝑢1 = 20 for 
all 𝑥 in [𝑡2, 𝑡1], 𝑢2 = 34.41780822  for all 𝑥 in [𝑡3, 𝑡1] and 𝑢3 = 19.00684932  for all 
𝑥 in [𝑡3, 𝑡2].  
 
Figure 4: Inverse CDF for every firm at every x, following the results summarized in Table 2. This is the 
expected behavior for every seller, they cannot have a better utility level following another CDF 
(strategy). (Reproduced from [8].) 
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Figure 5: Utility of every firm after applying (1) for all x. Note that, in equilibrium, the utility is the same 
at the interval within the firm’s support. (Reproduced from [8].). 
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Chapter 3 Reversed Bertrand 
Network 
This chapter introduces a way of using the existing model in a reversed manner: 
finding the size of the market from the prices, considering that companies are acting 
in equilibrium. Furthermore, in the next section, it is shown a case of a study 
demonstrating the application of this technique 
3.1 Preliminaries 
Understand the market potential is crucial for success or failure. For this work, it is 
proposed a different approach to analyze an existing market by looking at how companies 
are pricing. Considering that the Bertrand Network model is maturing in a growing 
literature of networked competitions, it can be said this approach is an innovative way of 
analyzing the competition. 
The following subsections will explain a work that has been accepted by the scientific 
community. In the existing model, from the competition network and with the size of the 
markets, it is possible to find the CDF and the best pricing range for each company. In 
the published work [8] the opposite has been proposed: From prices, it is possible to 
discover the size of the markets and have a hint of how the competition looks like. The 
idea is to figure out what has motivated the companies to be pricing the way they are 
doing. 
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3.2 Reversed application 
To demonstrate how to use it, the same warm-up example from the last section is used. 
Recall the results in Section 2.3: 𝑡1 = 1, 𝑡2 = 0.2294520548 and 𝑡3 = 0.102739726. 
For the sake of simplicity, 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 have been rounded to 0.23 and 0.10 respectively. 
From the results in [8], it is needed to collect prices to begin the analysis. Consider prices 
collected from day 𝑑1 to 𝑑𝑛 and let 𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑗 be the j-th price from the k-th day of the i-th 
firm. Let 𝑃𝑖 be a set of non-decreasing prices of the firm 𝑖. Finally, let 𝑃 be the union of 
every 𝑃𝑖. 
Since the existing model use prices from 0 to 1, let 𝑚 be the maximum price in 𝑃 and 





Not every price dataset can be used to find the CDF of the firms. If it is believed the 





Where 𝐶𝑖(𝑥) is a function that returns the number of elements in 𝑃𝑖 that is lesser than 𝑥. 
Note that finding the inverse CDF from the formula above is the same as saying the 
probability of randomly choosing the value of 𝑥 or higher. 
To better understand the proposed analysis, consider that prices have been collected and 
the following information has been extracted. 
• 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃1) = 1000€ 
• 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃1) = 230€ 
• 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃2) = 940€ 
• 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃2) = 120€ 
• 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃3) = 200€ 
                                                 
12 The more prices are collected, the more reliable the data set is. Few prices may not be enough to represent the exact curve of the 
desired inverse CDF function. 
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• 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃3) = 100€ 
The values listed above are graphically represented in the next Figure. 
 
Figure 6: “Observed” pricing range of each firm. 
 
The pricing range of each firm suggests that the competition network is a line of three 
sellers. It is necessary to be flexible when determining the support of each company. If  
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃2) = 940, it doesn’t mean the company would not choose the price of 950 euros: 
the price could just not have been collected. Therefore, when trying to identify in which 
equilibrium the observed prices belongs, some adaptations may be necessary. 
From the results in [7], the “observed” prices in Figure 6 seems to belong to the Mixed 
NE from competition with 3 sellers in line. The expected competition network is 
represented below. 
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Figure 7: Expected competition. The question marks represent if it is possible to find the size of the 
markets by only knowing the prices. (Reproduced from [8].) 
 
Note that 𝑡1 = 1 as it would be in any equilibrium [7]. Assume that 𝐹2(𝑡2) = 0.45 and 
𝐹1(𝑡1) = 0.23, values found after applying (2) in 𝑃2 and 𝑃1 respectively. 
Applying the model in the reversed manner. By following the equalities that must be 
satisfied in equilibrium: 
𝑢1(𝑡1) = 𝑢1(𝑡2) 








𝑢2(𝑡1) = 𝑢2(𝑡2) 
𝑡1 (α2 + β1,2𝐹1(𝑡1)) = 𝑡2(α2 + β1,2) 









𝑢2(𝑡2) = 𝑢2(𝑡3) 





α2 + β1,2 + β2,3
(5) 
 
𝑢3(𝑡2) = 𝑢3(𝑡3) 







Instead of finding the exact size of the markets, the following is used to reduce the 
problem to find just the ratio of the markets: 
α1 = 𝑎 ∗ β1,2 
α2 = 𝑏 ∗ β1,2 
α3 = 𝑐 ∗ β1,2 
β2,3 = 𝑘 ∗ β1,2 
The market share β1,2 (chosen by convenience) is always positive, otherwise, the market 
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Since “a” is defined only by constant values, then it is possible to treat “a” as a constant 
value. Proceeding with (4): 
𝑡2 =
𝑏 ∗ β1,2 + β1,2 ∗ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
















































This concludes the calculation and now it is possible to find the size of each market share 
by setting a value for β1,2. Note that there are many possible values for β1,2 and each will 
lead to different utility levels for each firm, the since the results are based on the ratio of 
each other market over β1,2, the prices and CDF will be the same. 
If β1,2 = 150 the following holds: 
α1 = 20.16233766 
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α2 = 0 
α3 = 0.0455 
β2,3 = 195 
It is worth noting that the prices have been rounded earlier, thus the approximated values 
for the markets. 
3.3 Properties 
First and foremost, this section presents profs and claims about the possibility of 
modifying the competition network to justify the observed prices. In other words, it just 
states that specific modifications (like adding a new seller to the network) will converge 
the prices and CDFs to be closer to the observed prices, but it does not guarantee the 
results will represent a NE. It is always necessary to verify the equilibrium in the modified 
network. The set of pricing ranges and strategies can be tested if they represents a NE in 
polynomial time by testing a Linear Program with 8 constraints [7], which basically tests 
if the utility level of every seller is the same when pricing at the bounds of their support, 
without having to test every price 𝑥. 
It is important to understand whether the analyst has a dataset with enough prices that can 
be used or not. Next, Theorem 3.1 and its corollaries will be useful to enhance the results 
of the application of the reversed method. Furthermore, it is also provided a way to test if 
the equilibrium form of a chosen competition network for a case of study could have 
given the observed prices. 
Theorem 3.1. Every inverse CDF is upper bounded. 
Proof. Fix any network and any equilibrium. Label firms such as α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ α𝑛 ≥
0. Let α𝑖 ≥ α𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 with 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑥3, 𝑥4 ∈ 𝑆𝑗  , 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 ≥ 𝑥4, the 
following must hold: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥2) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑥1) 
𝑥2 (α𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
) = 𝑥1 (α𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
) 
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α𝑖 =
𝑥1∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖) − 𝑥2∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
 
𝑎𝑖 ≥ 𝑎𝑗 
𝑥1∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖) − 𝑥2 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
𝑥2 − 𝑥1
≥
















Next, any 𝐹𝑚(𝑥), 𝑚 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖) has an upper bound which must be respected so the above 
inequality is true. Considering 𝑁(𝑖, −𝑚) is the set of neighbors of 𝑓𝑖 excluding 𝑚: 
𝑥 (α𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)

















− 𝑥4 ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥4)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑗,−𝑚)
) 
By moving every possible 𝐹𝑚(𝑥𝑖) to the left side of the inequality: 





























It is worth noting that β𝑗,𝑚 exists if, and only if there is a competition between 𝑓𝑗 and 𝑓𝑚. 
The expression above shows that any 𝐹𝑚(𝑥), for 𝑚 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖) is upper bounded. Note that 
it bounds every captive market 𝑖 < 𝑛. The last captive market is bounded in the following 
condition: 
α𝑛 ≥ 0 
α𝑛 =





















For 𝐹𝑚(𝑥1) for any seller 𝑚: 





























∑ β𝑛,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑛,−m) − ∑ β𝑛,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑛,−𝑚)
β𝑛,m
(9) 
Which holds for all 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ 𝑆𝑛, 𝑥1 ≥ 𝑥2. Therefore, from (7) and (9), every firm 𝑖 has 
CDFs in his utility in which they have an upper bound condition that must be respected 
so α𝑛 ≥ 0 and α𝑖 ≥ α𝑗  holds. 
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∎ 
The next corollaries follow from Theorem 3.1. 
Corollary 3.1. Any dataset is called reliable if, for every inverse CDF function calculated 
from the dataset using (2), its upper bound condition from Theorem 1 is true and every 
upper bound is lesser or equal than 1. Furthermore, a non-reliable dataset suggests 
hidden sellers exist in the network or the price data set is too small to be trusted. 
This claims just formalize the idea that any calculated CDF must respect the upper bound 
from the Theorem 4.1. 
Consider any equilibrium with 𝑛 sellers and a set of prices 𝑇 = {𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑘}, where 1 =
𝑡1 > ⋯ > 𝑡𝑘 > 0. After calculating the CDF for every firm 𝑖 for every price 𝑡𝑗 in the 
system using (2), the dataset can be called reliable if, 𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑗) for every 𝑖 and 𝑗, the 
inequality in (7) and (9) is true and every upper bound condition is lesser or equal than 1. 
If this is the case, every condition like α𝑖 ≥ α𝑗 ≥ 0 from the equilibrium sketch will be 
respected. 
∎ 
Corollary 3.2. If an upper bound condition from Theorem 3.1 is greater than 1, there 
may exist hidden sellers in the network that justify the prices companies are using. 
The idea of adding sellers to the network comes from the fact that inequalities must be 
true in any network. If any is false, then sellers might be missing in the network. So, if 
the missing sellers were considered in the calculations, the same inequality would be true. 













− 𝑥1 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖,−𝑚)









) − 𝑥1 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖,−𝑚) + 𝑥2∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
𝑥1β𝑖,𝑚
≤ 1 
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If the above condition is false, it is possible to add sellers to the network, so the inverse 
CDF function will be lesser or equal than 1. The following must hold so the above 












− 𝑥1 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖,−𝑚)
+ 𝑥2 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖)
 ≤ 𝑥1β𝑖,𝑚 
The overall result of the left part of the inequality will get smaller as more sellers are 
added to the network. It is enough to prove that any seller 𝑠 added to the network as a 
neighbor of 𝑗, containing at least the same support as 𝑓𝑗, decreases the following result: 
𝑥3 ∑ β𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥3)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑗)
− 𝑥4 ∑ β𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥4)
k∈𝑁(𝑗)
 
Therefore, considering 𝑁′(𝑗) = 𝑁(𝑗) ∪ {𝑠}, a function that unions a seller 𝑠 and the set 
of neighbors of 𝑗: 
𝑥3 ∑ β𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥3)
𝑘∈𝑁′(𝑗)
− 𝑥4 ∑ β𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥4)
k∈𝑁′(𝑗)
≤ 𝑥3 ∑ β𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥3)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑗)





− 𝑥4 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥4)
𝑘∈𝑁′(𝑗,−𝑠)
+ 𝑥3β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) − 𝑥4β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) 
≤ 𝑥3 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥3)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑗)
− 𝑥4 ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥4)
𝑘∈𝑁(𝑗)
 
Note that 𝑁′(𝑗, −𝑠) represents the neighbors of 𝑗 after the seller 𝑠 has been added to the 
network, whereas 𝑁(𝑗) represents the set of neighbors of 𝑗 where the seller s didn’t exist. 
In other words, 𝑁′(𝑗, −𝑠) = 𝑁(𝑗). 
𝑥3β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) − 𝑥4β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) ≤ 0 
𝑥3β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) ≤ 𝑥4β𝑖,𝑠𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) 
𝑥3𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) ≤ 𝑥4𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) 
𝑥4𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) ≤ 𝑥3𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) ≤ 𝑥4𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) 
𝐹𝑠(𝑥3) ≤ 𝐹𝑠(𝑥4) 
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If 𝑥3 > 𝑥4 and 𝑥3, 𝑥4 ∈ 𝑆𝑠, the last inequality is strict. Note that this result does not 
depend on β𝑖,𝑠. The last inequality does respect the fact that 𝐹𝑠(𝑥) may decrease as 𝑥 
increases. This concludes the prof, and if 𝐹𝑚(𝑥1) > 1 then it may suggest that more 
companies are competing in the network since many sellers can be added until the 
condition 𝐹𝑚(𝑥1) ≤ 1 is true. 
∎ 
Corollary 3.3. If an upper bound condition (9) from Theorem 4.1 is false, there may exist 
hidden sellers in the network that justify the prices companies are using 
Equation (9) states a condition which must be respected so α𝑖 ≥ 0 is true. If this is not 







∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥2)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖,−m) − ∑ β𝑖,𝑘𝐹𝑘(𝑥1)𝑘∈𝑁(𝑖,−𝑚)
β𝑖,m
 +  𝜀 
Where ε is a value that must be added so the above inequality will be true. Next, it is 
shown that it is possible to increase the right side of the inequality by just adding a seller 
𝑠 to the network in a similar way done in Corollary 4.2. Therefore, recalling that 𝑁′(𝑖) =
𝑁(𝑖) ∪ {𝑠}, it must be true that: 
𝑥2
𝑥1
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𝑥1𝐹𝑠(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑥2𝐹𝑠(𝑥2) 
𝑥2𝐹𝑠(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑥1𝐹𝑠(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑥2𝐹𝑠(𝑥2) 
𝑥2𝐹𝑠(𝑥1) ≤ 𝑥2𝐹𝑠(𝑥2) 
𝐹𝑠(𝑥1) ≤ 𝐹𝑠(𝑥2) ∀x1, x2 ∈ [0,1], x1 ≥ x2 
If 𝑥1 > 𝑥2, the above inequality is strict. This is always true, therefore, any seller 𝑠 can 
be added to the network since it implies 𝜀 > 0. So, if it is the case that (9) is false, it may 
be true that sellers are missing in the network that could have made (9) true. 
∎ 
Next observation provides a claim whether the chosen network is correct or not. 
Observation 3.1. Fix any network and any collected prices. It is possible to verify if there 
exists any size of markets that satisfy the observed prices by testing a non-linear system. 
Moreover, if the equation system does not have a solution, the network must be changed. 
Fix any network with 𝑛 vertices and label them such as α𝑖 ≥ α𝑖+1. Call 𝐵𝑖 the decreasing 
set of the boundary points in the support of 𝑓𝑖. Let 𝑇 = ∪𝑖
𝑛 𝐵𝑖 be the union of all these 
sets. If the fixed network is valid for the observed prices, every collected value must 
belong to the support of its firm. Therefore, any observed price 𝑝 of the seller 𝑖 must be 
in [𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1, 𝑡𝑖,𝑏], 𝑡𝑖,𝑏 ∈ 𝐵𝑖 for some 1 ≤ 𝑏 < |𝐵𝑖|. 
Recall that 𝑢𝑖(𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑡𝑖,𝑏) since both prices belongs to 𝑆𝑖. The price 𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1 can be 
found as: 
𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1 ⋅ (α𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1)
𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)




𝑡𝑖,𝑏 ⋅ (α𝑖 +∑ β𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖,𝑏)𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) )
α𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖,𝑏+1)𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
 
Every observed price must be inside of some interval in the support of 𝑖. Without loss of 
generality, assume the cases where |𝐵𝑖| = 2 for every 𝑖. Therefore, there is only one 
interval in the support of 𝑖: [𝑡𝑝, 𝑡𝑞]. Take the maximum and minimum observed price for 
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the seller 𝑖, namely, 𝑝𝑖,𝑀 and 𝑝𝑖,𝑚. There must exist some boundary values that embrace 
the observed values, that is, 𝑡𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑖,𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑖,𝑀 ≤ 𝑡𝑞. If there is no combination of market 
sizes that satisfies the given property for every seller 𝑖, them it is not possible that the 
fixed network, in equilibrium, could have given the observed prices. 
To formalize this observation, let 𝑘 = |𝑇|. Therefore, prices in 𝑇 is in the form 1 = 𝑡1 >
𝑡2 > ⋯ > 𝑡𝑘 > 0. Note that 𝑡𝑘 > 0 and 𝑡1 = 1 is true in any equilibrium. Let 𝑅𝑗 be the 
set of sellers that contains the price 𝑡𝑗 in his support. The following non-linear program 






𝑡𝑞 = 1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑀                                                             𝑞 = 1
𝑡𝑞 =
𝑡𝑟 ⋅ (𝛼ℎ + ∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(ℎ) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑟))
𝛼ℎ +∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(ℎ) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑞)
≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑀     𝑞 > 1
𝑡𝑝 =
𝑡𝑞 ⋅ (𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑞))
𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑝)
≤ 𝑝𝑖,𝑚     
 
Where 𝑡𝑟 > 𝑡𝑞, and seller ℎ is any seller that contains 𝑡𝑞 and 𝑡𝑟 in his support (in other 
words, the seller ℎ belongs to 𝑅𝑞 and 𝑅𝑟). This formalizes that every observed price for 
every seller must be within the expected support of its seller. If there is no combination 
of captive markets and market shares that satisfies the non-linear program above, for 
every seller 𝑖, then it is not possible to bound the observed prices in a way that respects 
the NE o the fixed competition network. 
∎ 
Observation 3.2. It is possible to know how much buyers might be willing to pay based 
on the observed prices. 
It is true that every observed price 𝑝 may be mapped using (2), respecting the fact prices 
must be in [0,1]. Nevertheless, using the same notion from the last observation, let 𝑝𝑖,𝑚
′ =
𝑝𝑖,𝑚 ∙ 𝑝𝑀 and 𝑝𝑖,𝑀
′ = 𝑝𝑖,𝑀 ∙ 𝑝𝑀 be the non-mapped prices, with 𝑝𝑀 being the highest price 
collected. Next is shown that this assumption can be relaxed, and another higher value 
can be used. The non-linear program has been changed and can be satisfied as follows, 
with 𝑝 ≥ 𝑝𝑀: 







𝑡𝑞 = 𝑝 ≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑀                                                                   𝑞 = 1
𝑡𝑞 = 𝑝 ⋅
𝑡𝑟 ⋅ (𝛼ℎ + ∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(ℎ) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑟))
𝛼ℎ + ∑ 𝛽ℎ,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(ℎ) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑞)
≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑀
′      𝑞 > 1
𝑡𝑝 = 𝑝 ⋅
𝑡𝑞 ⋅ (𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑞))
𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) ⋅ 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑝)
≤ 𝑝𝑖,𝑚
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
This chapter briefly explains how the research was made and how the data for the case 
of study has been collected. 
4.1 Research Design 
The starting point of this project was with the book The Art of Strategy [2]. The main 
point was to first understand what Game Theory is and how it is applied to economics 
and other decision-making problems. After a deep understating of the topic, quick 
research was made in the IEEE explore library and JSTOR with some key-words: game 
theory, Nash equilibrium, and market expansion. After finding the articles related to the 
area, the Google Scholar was used to find other articles that referenced the selected 
papers.  
This work started first with the idea to study the challenges a company would face in case 
of expanding into an existing market. After having found some articles from this field of 
study, it was noticed a mathematical model has been widely used recently to determine 
the behavior of the companies when competing in multiple markets at the same time. In 
special, the Cournot Networked model has been used in all those markets, as discussed in 
Section 2.2. 
After studying the model described in [9], it was noticed that in the Cournot Networked 
version firms can only compete by supplying an amount of a certain homogeneous good 
to the market. Since the main idea was to work with companies that would work by asking 
prices, the Bertrand competition model was found to be suitable. After reading the 
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Cournot model description and following the references in the article, it has been found 
that there exists a networked version for price competition.  
When the Bertrand Network model description was found, another research was made by 
using keywords such as Bertrand, Bertrand network, networked competition, etc. It was 
concluded that there were no works that used the pricing competition model and, in 
contrast to the Cournot Networked version, the model needed improvements and areas in 
which it could be applied. 
Since then, instead of aiming at making an algorithm to compute nash equilibria in an 
existing network, the goal of the work changed: enhance the model and suggest an area 
of application, with hypothetic examples and a real case of study. 
4.2 Case Study Strategy 
The main challenge was to verify which kind of competition would be suitable for the 
Bertrand Networked model since its main assumption is that firms should randomize to 
be unpredictable. It has been found that online selling fits perfectly in this scenario [4]. It 
has been chosen the airfare competition because it is widely known for its dynamic 
pricing and there are tools available to collect prices automatically. 
It was considered an airfare competition in which firms ask prices for their homogeneous 
service: a round-trip from Porto do Rome. Companies may have loyal buyers due to a bad 
experience with other companies, as well as buyers that are seeking for the lowest price 
possible.  
In this case, companies face a tradeoff between charge a higher price to extract the 
maximum surplus from his loyal buyers or lower down the price to be more competitive, 
allowing to win a portion of the market. It fits perfectly in the basic assumptions of the 
existing networked pricing competition model of Bertrand. 
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4.3 Data Collection Method 
Although there are many tools available to collect prices over time, the Google flight 
tracking has been used to daily collect the three cheapest flight. Since many 
improvements to the model were required by the time data collection was needed, instead 
of focusing on an excellent gathering method, a service that could give the name of the 
companies, their price and easily available has been chosen. 
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Chapter 5 Case of study 
This chapter presents a case of study of the dynamic price in the airline industry. All 
the analysis reasoning is presented, showing also how to make use of some profs from 
the previous chapter. 
5.1 Preliminaries 
The Bertrand Network model considers that firms must mix within their support. 
Recalling the first section of this paper, the price of a microwave changed 9 times in 
response to Amazon’s price changing. 
Other services are empirically known as having many price changes are, but not limited 
to online products (as said before), bus and train tickets, accommodation services and 
airfares, widely known to have price changed many times in a day. In the Airline-Industry, 
complex strategies and methods to assign prices have been used [33], where several 
financial, marketing, commercial and social factors have been considered. Many 
techniques try to help the buyer to find the most affordable price [33, 34, 35].  
In the nutshell, buyers will most benefit to buy the ticket far in advance, while sellers will 
do their best to figure out the demand for each flight with the huge database of previous 
flight and sell they possess [34]. 
Since there are many price changes for the same service (flight from A to B), air transport 
service has been chosen as a case of study. It was collected prices for the same route using 
the Google Flight tracking report. Each report gives three cheapest prices for that day. 6 
companies appeared for the route Porto–Rome 11th – 16th May (roundtrip): Ryanair, Air 
Europa, Brussels Airlines, TAP, Vueling, and Iberia, yielding 72 prices combined. 
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Figure 9: Lower bound for each company per day in euro, collected from March 12 to March 23. 
 
Table 3: Price data set. Strikethrough bolded red prices represent prices that haven’t appeared on the 
report of that day, which means that the next price of that firm in the dataset has been used as a lower 
bound. 
 Ryanair Air Europa 
Brussels 
Airlines 
TAP Vueling Iberia 
Mar 12 88 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 13 107 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 14 99 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 15 119 157 210 233 217 144 
Mar 16 119 157 210 233 217 144 
Mar 17 119 157 210 233 217 144 
Mar 18 127 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 19 127 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 20 127 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 21 112 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 22 112 160 210 233 217 144 
Mar 23 119 165 210 233 217 144 
Mar 24 119 165 210 233 217 144 
Mar 25 119 165 210 233 217 144 
Mar 26 149 165 210 233 217 144 
Mar 27 125 165 210 233 187 144 
Mar 28 125 165 210 233 187 144 
Mar 29 125 165 210 233 187 144 
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Mar 30 125 165 210 233 187 144 
Mar 31 125 165 210 233 187 117 
Apr 1 125 165 210 233 187 117 
Apr 2 125 165 210 233 187 117 
Apr 3 115 175 210 233 187 117 
Apr 4 115 175 210 233 187 117 
Apr 5 142 175 210 233 187 134 
Apr 6 142 175 210 233 187 134 
Apr 7 142 175 210 233 187 134 
Apr 8 142 162 210 233 187 117 
Apr 9 142 162 210 233 187 117 
Apr 10 180 177 210 233 187 134 
Apr 11 171 187 210 233 187 124 
Apr 12 171 187 210 233 187 124 
Apr 13 171 187 210 233 202 110 
Apr 14 171 187 210 233 202 118 
Apr 15 183 187 210 233 202 110 
Apr 16 183 187 210 233 202 110 
Apr 17 183 187 210 233 202 110 
Apr 18 183 187 210 233 202 118 
Apr 19 183 187 210 233 202 118 
Apr 20 180 187 210 233 202 110 
Apr 21 198 187 210 233 202 118 
Apr 22 198 187 210 233 202 111 
Apr 23 165 187 210 233 202 118 
Max 198 187 210 233 217 144 
Min 88 157 210 233 187 10 
5.2 Guessing the competition network 
To guess the competition network based on the pricing range of each company, pricing 
range of the sellers were drawn in a paper and by checking the results in [7] it has been 
concluded the competition network looked like the one shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 
it is shown the comparison of the collected price ranges and the expected competition 
based on what has been observed. 
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Figure 10: Typical equilibrium sketch for a unit shared market. (Reproduced from [7].) 
 
Because TAP had only asked one price, it was assumed they are only asking the 
monopolized price because the market share does not worth it: they would always have a 
lower utility level if they try to extract any surplus form β0,5. Considering that other 
pricing ranges are getting lower and 𝑓5 (Ryanair) have a wide support, it was considered 
the observed competition looks like an instance of the right-most star network in Figure 




Figure 11: Observed prices (a) and adapted support of each firm (b). Each company from left to right in 
(a) has been labeled as: 𝑓5, 𝑓0, 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3 and 𝑓4 respectively. In (a), left arrowed blue lines indicates that 
that company had the same maximum and minimum price in the dataset. 
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In any star network with the unit shared market, firm supports do not overlap. Therefore, 
the minimum price of Brussels Airlines 𝑓1 and the maximum price of Vueling 𝑓2has been 
changed to its middle point 
210+217
2
= 213.5. Minimum and maximum pricing range of 
Iberia 𝑓4 has been changed to match the minimum price of Ryanair 𝑓5 and the minimum 
price of Air Europa 𝑓3 respectively. Since the minimum price appeared in the dataset for 
𝑓1 is equal to its maximum price, the upper bound of his support has changed to match 
the settings of the known equilibrium in Figure 10 (b). It makes sense in the meaning of 
the maximum price of 𝑓1 may not be the real maximum price the firm may ask. Raising 
his upper bound to 233 euros match the equilibrium requirements. 
5.3 Equilibrium form 
Since the equilibrium sketch for any star network considers a unit shared market, every 
market share β𝑖,𝑗 may be represented simply as β > 0. Following the results in [7], firms 
have been labeled so that the following holds: α𝑖 ≥ α𝑖+1 for 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4. 
In this context, since a range of prices have been observed, at least one captive market 
must be greater than zero. From the results in the original model [7], if there are firms 
mixing in equilibrium, at least one of them has a positive captive market, otherwise every 
seller will as a fixed price equals to his marginal cost (a pure NE). 
First, prices must be in [0,1]. Therefore, by dividing every price by 233: 
𝑡1 = 𝑡0 = 1 
𝑡2 = 0.91630901287 
𝑡3 = 0.80257510729 
𝑡4 = 0.67381974248 
𝑡5 = 0.37768240343 
For the sake of simplicity, since 𝑡0 = 𝑡1, 𝑡0 has been removed from the settings. Formally, 
the following must hold for this competition: 
𝑡1𝛼0 = 𝑢0(𝑡1) 
𝑡2 (α1 + β𝐹5(𝑡2)) = 𝑢1(𝑡2) = 𝑢1(𝑡1) = 𝑡1α1 
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𝑡3 (α2 + β𝐹5(𝑡3)) = 𝑢2(𝑡3) = 𝑢2(𝑡2) = 𝑡2 (α2 + β𝐹5(𝑡2)) 
𝑡4 (α3 + β𝐹5(𝑡4)) = 𝑢3(𝑡4) = 𝑢3(𝑡3) = 𝑡3 (α3 + β𝐹5(𝑡3)) 
𝑡5 (α4 + β𝐹5(𝑡5)) = 𝑢4(𝑡5) = 𝑢4(𝑡4) = 𝑡4 (α4 + β𝐹5(𝑡4)) 
𝑢5(𝑡1) = 𝑢5(𝑡2) = 𝑢5(𝑡3) = 𝑢5(𝑡4) = 𝑢5(𝑡5) 
1 = 𝐹0(𝑡5) = 𝐹0(𝑡4) = 𝐹0(𝑡3) = 𝐹0(𝑡2) = 𝐹0(𝑡1) 
1 = 𝐹5(𝑡5) > 𝐹5(𝑡4) > 𝐹5(𝑡3) > 𝐹5(𝑡2) > 𝐹5(𝑡1) = 0 
1 = 𝐹4(𝑡5) > 𝐹4(𝑡4) = 𝐹4(𝑡3) = 𝐹4(𝑡2) = 𝐹4(𝑡1) = 0 
1 = 𝐹3(𝑡5) = 𝐹3(𝑡4) > 𝐹3(𝑡3) = 𝐹3(𝑡2) = 𝐹3(𝑡1) = 0 
1 = 𝐹2(𝑡5) = 𝐹2(𝑡4) = 𝐹2(𝑡3) > 𝐹2(𝑡2) = 𝐹2(𝑡1) = 0 
1 = 𝐹1(𝑡5) = 𝐹1(𝑡4) = 𝐹1(𝑡3) = 𝐹1(𝑡2) > 𝐹1(𝑡1) > 0 
Finding every price 𝑡𝑖 in the system. Next is shown the expressions which solves the 
equilibrium sketch for this network. First, for every price 𝑡𝑖 in the system: 
𝑢𝑖(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑢𝑖(𝑡𝑖+1), 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 5 
𝑡𝑖 (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡𝑖)) = 𝑡𝑖+1 (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡𝑖+1)) 
𝑡𝑖+1 =
𝑡𝑖 (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡𝑖))
(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡𝑖+1))
 
 
𝑢5(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑢5(𝑡𝑖+1), 1 < 𝑖 < 5 
𝑡𝑖(𝛼5 + 𝑖 ⋅ 𝛽) = 𝑡𝑖+1(𝛼5 + (𝑖 + 1) ⋅ 𝛽) 
𝑡𝑖+1 =
𝑡𝑖(𝛼5 + 𝑖 ⋅ 𝛽)
(𝛼5 + (𝑖 + 1) ⋅ 𝛽)
 
 
𝑢5(𝑡1) = 𝑢5(𝑡2) 
𝑡1 (𝛼5 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹0(𝑡1) + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)) = 𝑡2 (𝛼5 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹0(𝑡2) + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡2)) 
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(𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)) = 𝑡2(𝛼5 + 2 ⋅ 𝛽) 
𝑡2 =
(𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1))
(𝛼5 + 2 ⋅ 𝛽)
 








(α5 + 4β)(α4 + β)





With similar reasoning, the rest of the inverse CDFs of seller 5 is: 
𝐹5(𝑡3) =
(α5 + 3β) (α3 + β ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡4))






(α5 + 2β) (α2 + β ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡3))





And finally, by using 𝑡2 as ma iddle point: 




α1 + β ⋅ 𝐹5(𝑡2)
 
𝐹1(𝑡1) =
𝛼1 ⋅ (𝛼5 + 2𝛽)





For the sake of simplicity, every price 𝑡𝑖 will be reduced as follows: 
𝑡2 =
𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝛼5 + 2 ⋅ 𝛽
 
𝑡3 =
𝑡2 ⋅ (𝛼5 + 2 ⋅ 𝛽)
𝛼5 + 3 ⋅ 𝛽
⇒ 𝑡3 =
𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝛼5 + 3 ⋅ 𝛽
 
𝑡4 =
𝑡3 ⋅ (𝛼5 + 3 ⋅ 𝛽)
𝛼5 + 4 ⋅ 𝛽
⇒ 𝑡4 =
𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝛼5 + 4 ⋅ 𝛽
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𝑡5 =
𝑡4 ⋅ (𝛼5 + 4 ⋅ 𝛽)
𝛼5 + 5 ⋅ 𝛽
⇒ 𝑡5 =
𝛼5 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝛼5 + 5 ⋅ 𝛽
 
Reducing the markets as a ratio of 𝛃. To simplify the calculations, every captive market 
has been modified to be a ration of β, similar to what have been done in the last chapter. 
Therefore, let 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖 ⋅ 𝛽 for every 𝑖. 
𝑡2 =
𝑟5 ⋅ 𝛽 + 𝛽 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 ⋅ 𝛽 + 2 ⋅ 𝛽
=
















𝑟1 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 2)
𝑟1 + 𝐹5(𝑡2)
− 𝑟5 − 1 
𝐹5(𝑡2) =








(𝑟5 + 4)(𝑟4 + 1)
𝑟5 + 5
− 𝑟4 
5.4 The correctness of the guessed competition network 
Next, from Corollary 3.1, it is shown the dataset is not reliable, therefore bounds are used 
to determine the size of the captive market of each seller. 
The dataset is not reliable. To prove this argument, it is enough to show that α4 ≥ α5 
fails to be true respecting the upper bound condition in (7).  
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From (7), by upper bounding 𝐹5(𝑡4): 
α4 ≥ α5 









𝑡4β𝐹4(𝑡4) + 𝑡4β𝐹3(𝑡4) + 𝑡4β𝐹2(𝑡4) + 𝑡4β𝐹1(𝑡4) + 𝑡4β𝐹0(𝑡4)




𝑡4β𝐹5(𝑡4) − 𝑡5β𝐹5(𝑡5) ≤
𝑡5 − 𝑡4
𝑡5 − 𝑡4
(4𝑡4β − 5𝑡5β) 
𝑡4β𝐹5(𝑡4) ≤ 4𝑡4β − 5𝑡5β + 𝑡5β 
𝑡4𝐹5(𝑡4) ≤ 4𝑡4 − 5𝑡5 + 𝑡5 
𝑡4𝐹5(𝑡4) ≤ 4𝑡4 − 4𝑡5 




Substituting the values of 𝑡5 and 𝑡4 yields 𝐹5(𝑡4) ≤  1.75796178343. From Corollary 
3.1, the dataset is not reliable. 
There is no combination of markets sizes, nor top price that buyers are willing to 
pay, that justify the price firms are asking. From observation 3.2 and without loss of 
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Where 𝑚 ≥ 233 is the maximum price the buyers are willing to pay. The first and second 
condition asserts that there are two prices that bounds the expected support of 𝑓4 and the 
third condition assert that the top price bounding 144 does not pass the minimum price 
observed from 𝑓3. The last two conditions must be exact because it was seen in the dataset 
(see Figure 7). 
From the last condition:  
𝑚 ⋅ 𝑟5 + 𝑚 ⋅ (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑟5 + 2
= 213.5 
𝑚 ⋅ 𝑟5 + 𝑚 ⋅ (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) = 213.5 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 2) 
𝑟5 ⋅ (𝑚 − 213.5) = 427 − 𝑚 ⋅ (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) 
𝑟5 =
427 −𝑚 ⋅ (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑚 − 213.5
 
Continuing the penultimate condition: 
𝑚 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑟5 + 3
= 187 
𝑚 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) = 187(𝑟5 + 3) 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) + 𝑟5(𝑚 − 187) = 561 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) +
427 −𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑚 − 213.5
⋅ (𝑚 − 187) = 561 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) +
427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 187) − 𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) ⋅ (𝑚 − 187)
𝑚 − 213.5
= 561 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) (𝑚 − 213.5) + 427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 187) + 𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) ⋅ (187 − 𝑚)
𝑚 − 213.5
= 561 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) (−26.5) + 427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 187) = 561 ⋅ (𝑚 − 213.5) 
−26.5𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) − 134𝑚 = −39924.5 
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The domain of every Inverse CDF is [0,1]. Note that, in this context, 0 < 𝐹1(𝑡1) <


















Since 𝑚 must be greater or equal to 233, the bounds founded for 𝑚 are valid. From the 
next constraint in the non-linear system: 
𝑚 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑟5 + 4
≤ 157 
𝑚 ⋅ (𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) ≤ 157(𝑟5 + 4) 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) + 𝑟5(𝑚 − 157) ≤ 628 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) +
427 −𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1))
𝑚 − 213.5
⋅ (𝑚 − 157) ≤ 628 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) +
427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 187) − 𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) ⋅ (𝑚 − 187)
𝑚 − 213.5
≤ 628 
CHAPTER 5. CASE OF STUDY 
54 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) (𝑚 − 213.5) + 427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 157) +𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) ⋅ (157 − 𝑚)
𝑚 − 213.5
≤ 628 
𝑚(1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) (−56.5) + 427 ⋅ (𝑚 − 157) ≤ 628 ⋅ (𝑚 − 213.5) 
−56.5𝑚 (1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)) − 201𝑚 ≤ −86681 























From the last calculations, 𝑚 is bounded from 276.05 to 336.62 in which will respect the 
fact that 𝐹1(𝑡1) is in (0,1), for any positive captive markets market shares. The first bound 
founded for 𝑚 is from 233 to 248.75, since the intervals are disjoint, it is not possible to 
respect both bounds at the same time. It is possible to conclude without having to check 
other constraints that, for this competition network, there is no combination of market 
sizes that can motivate 𝑓1 to price from 187 euros to 213.5, doesn’t matter how much the 
buyers are willing to pay. 
The conclusion is that the competition network must be modified by adding sellers or it 
is completely different. 
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5.5 Modifying the network 
Note that, in the non-linear system, the variables involved were 𝑟5, 𝑚 and 𝐹1(𝑡1). The 
size of the captive markets influences in the price decision of every company, but in the 
non-linear system used to show the correctness of the network structure, adding a 
competitor against any seller excluding 𝑓5 will only influence the result of 𝐹1(𝑡1). Neither 
𝑟5 nor 𝑚 depends on who other companies are sharing markets.  
In fact, the non-linear system has no solution and adding any competitor against the firms 
𝑓0, 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3 and 𝑓4 will not change the fact that 𝐹1(𝑡1) is bounded in (0,1). Therefore, in 
it is concluded that it is only possible to fix the network by adding sellers against 𝑓5. 
Otherwise, the whole network must be changed. 














𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1) + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 5 + 𝑟6
≤ 88
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1) + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 4 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡4)
≥ 144
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1) + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 4 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡4)
≤ 157
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1) + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 3 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡3)
= 187
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1) + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 2 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡2)
= 213.5
 
For the sake of the argument, suppose the support of seller 6 is [𝑡5, 𝑡3]. Therefore, the 














𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 5 + 𝑟6
≤ 88         
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 4 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡4)
> 144
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 4 + 𝑟6 ⋅ 𝐹6(𝑡4)
≤ 157
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 3
= 187       
𝑚 ⋅
𝑟5 + 1 + 𝐹1(𝑡1)
𝑟5 + 2
= 213.5   
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The two last constraints are the same of the equation system used in the last subsection. 
















After using the WolframAlpha13 to solve the non-linear system above, the following 
results have been found: 















The following values above will respect the non-linear equation system above, therefore 
a solution exists that respects the prices asked from the companies, but only after adding 
a new seller to the competition network. 
5.6 Understanding the results 
Since it was shown that the guessed competition network cannot have a solution without 
being modified, a new seller was added against the firm 𝑓5, satisfying the price 
constraints. If the network is correct, the following information can be considered 
successfully discovered after the reversed application of the Bertrand Network model: 
Buyers are willing to pay up to 248 euros. Considering the following constraint:  













The captive market of the seller 𝒇𝟓 is roughly 5 times greater than the size of the 





There is at least one more seller against 𝒇𝟓. For the sake of the argument, it has been 
assumed the support of the seller 𝑓6 is [𝑡5, 𝑡3]. The following probabilities for the seller 
𝑓6 is: 
𝐹6(𝑡3) = 0 




𝐹6(𝑡5) = 1 
The size of the captive market of the added seller 𝒇𝟔 is bounded and positive. From 







By setting 𝐹6(𝑡4) = 0.07637357379: 
7.06367924535 ≤ 𝑟6 ≤  33.8472662644 
Every seller has a positive captive market. Since α𝑖 ≥ α𝑖+1, for 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4 and α5 =
𝑟5 ⋅ β is positive, it can be concluded that every seller has a set of loyal buyers at their 
disposal. 
The buyers may be categorized in 6 different ways. The equilibrium theory seeks to 
explain how things happen and not why [2]. By looking at the price of the companies and 
showing that, for the chosen network, another seller is needed so the observed prices may 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and future 
work 
This chapter ends the project by presenting briefly what has been done so far, as well 
explaining the scientific contribution of this work, showing that this topic is seeking 
contributions. At the end of the second subsection, open problems are presented, 
which may guide the reader if the person gets interested to continue this work. 
6.1 Discussion 
This work has presented a way to analyze an existing competition among forms in which 
can be seen that clearly, firms influence the pricing decision of others even though they 
are not direct competitors. To be able to achieve the results shown in the last chapter, a 
lot of work has been demanded to identify the properties of the young and maturing 
Bertrand Network model, studying all the tiny details and then, presenting formal proofs 
that firms may exist if some conditions are not met.  
Moreover, it is even possible to compute if an equilibrium may exist by solving a non-
linear system of equations, from the results in Observation 3.1. Furthermore, 
Observation 3.2 states that it is possible to guess the maximum price that the buyers from 
the given network, in equilibrium, are willing to pay, which could justify the observed 
prices. 
Although the results of the case of study are not accurate since it was now shown all the 
size of all markets, bounds have been provided, showing that, from the proofs in this 
work, it is possible to analyze the market to gather information from the competition, 
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having a glimpse of how the competition may look like if a seller decides to join the 
competition. 
It is worth noting the reversed application of the existing model proposed in this work has 
been successfully accepted by the scientific community. The paper titled as “A 
demonstration of an application of the Bertrand Network: Guessing the distribution of 
buyers within the market” has been accepted and presented in the 18th Conference of 
the Portuguese Association of Information Systems (CAPSI 18), held in the 
Polytechnic Institute of Santarém - Portugal. The same article was also accepted in the 
Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems 2018 
(FedCSIS 2018), held this year in Poland. 
The paper was praised by the explanation of the existing method, as wells as the 
outstanding literature review presented in the introduction of the paper, which reinforces 
that the theme chosen for this work was successfully selected following the current needs 
in the Game Theory. 
The article presented in the CAPSI has been chosen as one of the best articles of the 
conference, which will be published and index in the Lecture Notes of the Germany 
publishing company Springer. The editors invited the authors to produce another article 
following the same field of study, having been produced and named as “Reversed 
application of the Bertrand Network”, which is under analysis to be published and index 
in the Association for Information Systems (AIS) Electronic Library (AISeL). The 
last paper focused to explain the idea behind the reversed application, its properties 
(proofs and claims) and a demonstration to better understand the general idea. 
6.2 Open problems 
In the results, it was not stated if the modified network has prices and probabilities that 
leads to equilibrium because there is no generic way to find a NE in any given network, 
but it does not change the general results from the reversed application since it provide 
claims that the competition network must be changed and it is very likely that the 
equilibrium may contain the calculated prices and probabilities. 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
61 
It is needed to provide profs for other classes of graphs, in which may give more flexibility 
to the analyst to determine which competition structure could have motivated the firms 
to be pricing the way it was observed.  
As stated before, currently, there is no algorithm to calculate the Nash Equilibrium of any 
network, which can be an interesting work to be done. Nevertheless, it is important to 
apply this model in other real cases, which can be used to test the profs and claims 
presented in this work, modifying or presenting more profs that can make the analysis 
easier. 
Another interesting area of study would apply both gathering methods to collect prices in 
real time and the equilibrium verification, which can be used to identify why companies 
are pricing in one specific way, as well as identify when sellers leave or join other 
markets, based on drastic changes in their pricing decisions. 
It is also important to consider that a competition in equilibrium may not be profitable to 
a firm, forcing the seller to leave the market. A way to calculate if a competition in 
equilibrium may lead to a firm leaving the market may be interesting to investigate. 
Furthermore, applying a production/service cost is also another important point to 
consider, a modification of the utility function which considers this cost was already 
studied by the authors of the existing model and it is presented in [3]. 
Last, but not least, it is important to expand the model to allow a mix of oligopolies (three 
or more sellers sharing the same market) and duopolies. Currently, the existing model 
does not allow this type of competition structure. An attempt to expand the model has 
been tried during the development of this work and the results are presented in [8]. 
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